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NOTAS
1. Introduction
As the world-wide recession persists, the 
age-old problem of defining unemployment 
equilibrium is underscored. The benchmark 
of all mainstream models remains the starred 
value of the level of output and actual output 
is assumed to tend towards the market-clear-
ing level. Price, notably wage, stickiness are 
roadblocks on that path. However, since ex-
pressions like “secular stagnation” become 
common coin across leading scholars across 
the methodological spectrum, the search for 
coherent explanations and optimal policy ar-
rangements becomes urgent. Macroeconomic 
policy has become more or less synonymous 
with monetary policy. At heart, the classical 
neutrality and dichotomy theorems are still 
held. Markets are believed to be the best of the 
possible institutions in the absence of worka-
ble arrangements to the contrary. In that case, 
the optimal level of output is generated by the 
freedom of people to “truck, barter and ex-
change”. The fiscal authority must be a min-
imal state addressing only the well-known 
cases of “market failure”. Accordingly, the 
yardstick here is budget balance. Under the 
extraordinary circumstances of the times as 
well as, independently, the deterioration of 
physical and social infrastructure across the 
developed and the underdeveloped world, the 
expenditure side of the budget is a topic of 
academic and popular concern. Thus, blue-
prints for large projects are being drawn up in 
the US and Europe. The eventual budgetary 
implications worry framers because the theo-
ry of income taxation seems to offer no fresh 
ideas on balance. Economists have stayed 
with the negative work inducement effects of 
increased taxation and only serious philoso-
phers and some sociologists have found the 
topic worthy of interest in the social econo-
my-wide ramifications of systems of taxation. 
Ragnar Frisch was a great scholar of eco-
nomic change and microeconomic reasoning. 
Students of dynamics must return to the sem-
inal paper or two by him for understanding 
the true meaning of the term. His pioneering 
contributions to rigorous policy interventions 
were less known because the English-speaking 
world did not benefit from their translation. 
Agnar Sandmo, 2017, has therefore rendered 
yeoman’s service in bringing to light his in-
sights into a topic that cannot be more relevant 
to modern times. Considering the pedigree of 
this illustrious Norwegian economist, his ex-
position merits equal serious attention as well. 
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We synthesise the insights of the two giants as 
well as add our interpretation of their analysis. 
2. A micro-macro metric
Frisch sought to explain the phenomenon of 
suboptimal employment. While there may be 
equilibrium in the labour market, actual em-
ployment is short of the quantity required to 
maximize the social surplus. The maximum 
social surplus is that which maximizes the 
sum of the utilities of all economic agents. 
Already the element of spillovers arises as 
interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot 
be disregarded. The objective of the policy 
intervention being examined is to bring total 
output in congruence with the maximization of 
the utilities of all members of society. A mac-
roeconomic orientation is supported by recent 
advocacies of a sea change in thinking about 
the philosophy of taxation (Silvestri, 2015). 
The tax system in these proposals is the node 
of a social contract that is at the intersection 
point of lateral and vertical relationships, be-
tween citizens, and between citizens and gov-
ernment. Our treatment below can be regarded 
as the join between the benefit-cost principle 
and the ability-to-pay principle. With regard 
to the latter and in the context of a recession, 
taxation of wage income should be ‘optimal’. 
In macroeconomic translation, wage increases 
must go hand-in-glove with productivity in-
creases. Concerning the former, some studies 
have unearthed a connection between taxpay-
ers’ willingness to pay taxes with the ability 
to track how the collected resources are spent 
(Flores-Macias, 2016). While there might be 
a minority case for secrecy in the delibera-
tions of monetary policy committees, in the 
case of all elements of fiscal policy there is a 
consensus on transparency and disclosure. As 
in the case of “people’s audits” in some coun-
tries, civil society monitoring committees are 
formed to follow the expenditure of revenues 
from income taxes. Uncertainty and mistrust 
is reduced when expenditures are seen to cor-
respond to the preferences of the general pop-
ulace. 
Professor Sandmo reports that Professor 
Frisch vacillated between the production unit 
as a household and as a firm. In the latter 
case, he moved between a firm and the sector 
to which it belonged. His definitions of inter-
nal and external productivity were concerned 
with different levels of aggregation. Also, 
the underlying orientation seemed to be the 
theory of externalities and public economics. 
From the broad neighborhood, we recall the 
long line of French ingénieur-economists who 
founded the theory of project appraisal and 
went on to write the basics in the theory of 
public economics. We, on the other hand, find 
echoes of Frisch in the economics of Keynes, 
in macroeconomics. Frisch worked with the 
net wage rate, the real wage net of the mar-
ginal tax rate as a policy composite. He right-
ly intuited that the relative strengths of the 
income and substitution effects would deter-
mine the direction of labour supply. His atten-
tion was directed no less to the wage rate than 
to the tax rate to the extent of entertaining the 
former as a policy variable as well. Thus, Ag-
nar Sandmo illuminates the tensions in Rag-
nar Frisch in juggling with the implications of 
competition and the attractions of global op-
tima afforded by central planning solutions. 
The modern debate revolves around a “living 
wage” that must be associated with “decent 
work” (Carr et al, 2016). Living wages are 
often legislated. Our common expectation, on 
the other hand, is that an “optimal” wage will 
lead to increased consumption and employ-
ment and further to motivation and increased 
productivity at workplaces. In multi-market 
terms, outcomes in the labour market disturb 
the equilibrium in the commodities market. In 
order to distinguish our micro-grounded mac-
ro with partial equilibrium analysis we note 
the difference between perfect/imperfect in-
formation and asymmetric information. The 
former is public, the latter private. No better 
scenario than the post-war reconstruction ef-
forts that inspired Professor Frisch to make 
the general point that shortages or gluts will 
impact on all agents. Coming to the specif-
ic situation of a recession that endures, the 
stockpiling of goods and people seeking work 
at the factory gates is common knowledge. At 
worst, this perfect information might pick up 
noise on its way to the statistics desks of pol-
icy makers or planners, becoming imperfect. 
Secondly, the information explosion in the 
hands of the authorities backed by a regime 
of random auditing and stiff penalties accept-
ed by people because strictly implemented 
would induce tax compliance. At the same 
time, herd behavior might prevail locally 
(Alm, 2017). If one’s peers are not truthfully 
revealing their income and meet with success, 
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the representative agent might be motivated 
to follow suit. 
Frisch worked with cardinal utility functions 
so he did not see the need to incorporate the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure in his calculations. It turns out that 
that distinction with ordinality is not relevant 
in his treatment. In any case, the status report is 
that the utilitarian starting point was abandoned 
early (Hoover, 2016). Vilfredo Pareto and others 
all the way to Lionel Robbins replaced cardinal 
utility with ordinal utility and rendered the utility 
function inconsequential. All the same, there are 
checks and balances that we need to impose on 
our treatment in either instance. Katzner & Skott, 
2004, is the summary of a scholarly discussion 
surrounding the capture of efficiency in efficien-
cy wage models. In the work of Joseph E. Stiglitz 
notably the theory was used to suggest Keynes-
type outcomes. Stiglitz arrangements are bilater-
al contracts emerging from the asymmetric infor-
mation that characterizes principals and agents. 
Credit rationing, for instance, emerges from the 
inability of banks to discriminate between the 
prospectuses of “blue–eyed” and high-risk bor-
rowers. In the case of interest to us, the efficiency 
wage would be higher than the market-clearing 
wage so as to induce higher effort. The literature 
referred to in the Katzner & Skott survey shows 
that the movement from the production function 
of microeconomics to the “production function” 
of efficiency wage theory is hazardous. At the 
heart of the problem is the measurement of “ef-
fort”. Both with Frisch and our interpretation, the 
knotty issue of the measurement of variables is 
circumvented when dealing with working hours. 
While leisure might be a slippery concept to pin 
down, when total time is specified and the resid-
ual from the time spent in the factory is termed 
leisure we are on safe ground. 
3. The Frisch production function: a 
reformulation
Our basic representative consumer-worker 
utility maximization problem is no different 
from that posed by Sandmo (2017: 9). Our 
problem below corresponds to his equation 
(6). Denoting by T, total time available; by l, 
the time allocated to leisure; T - l = x is the 
consumer’s supply of working hours; the price 
of the single commodity is p and the wage rate 
is w. In that case, the program of the represent-
ative agent is to
Maximize u(c, l) subject to pc ≤ wx 
The solution is given by the following two 
equations
𝑢𝑢′
𝑢𝑢′
= 𝑝𝑝  
𝑤𝑤
 (1)
wx* = pc*  (2)
While interpersonal utility comparisons are 
sufficient they are not necessary (Hoover, 2016). 
From Jeremy Bentham through Stanley Jevons, 
only intrapersonal comparisons of utility are 
needed to derive exchange ratios. Exchange 
value is the same as relative price. Moving to 
the producer characterized by the technological 
blueprint called a production function f(x), her 
problem is to maximize profits given by (see 
also equation (14) in Sandmo (2017: 13)). 
π(x) = pf(x) - wx  (3)
The first-order condition obtained both by 
him and us is that the flow of labour hours will 
continue till “internal marginal productivity is 
equal to the wage rate” (2017:13). Summariz-
ing this first-order condition with that above, 
equation 1, as does Professor Sandmo with his 
equations (13) and (15), we have
𝑓𝑓 = 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑢𝑢′′
𝑢𝑢′
 
𝑝𝑝
(x)  (4)
We are ready to provide our own interpreta-
tions of Frisch’s seminal definitions.
DEFINITION 1. “Internal” or “direct pro-
ductivity” and “external” or “indirect produc-
tivity” 
Internal or what we call ex ante productiv-
ity is the marginal product of labour or the de-
rivative of the production function in equation 
4, no different from the definition of Professor 
Frisch. The redoubtable scholar defines external 
marginal productivity as the increase in output 
brought about the efforts of all other workers 
in the economy which is assumed to act posi-
tively on the efforts of our given worker. The 
production function would have an additional 
argument with a positive sign denoting the ag-
gregate hours worked by all but the one worker 
under consideration. The scholar does note that 
in a large economy the two arguments collapse 
into one. In contrast, we define external produc-
tivity or productivity ex post as the substitution 
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of the solution of the worker problem given in 
equation 2 into the production function. That 
is f (pc*/w). We incorporate the feedback ef-
fect of the ‘other’ individual’s behavior into the 
producer’s actual production. Feedback can be 
both positive or negative. The macroeconomic 
process is precisely the sway of positive feed-
back from the chosen market to other markets. 
Indeed, the cumulative upward or downward 
process is regarded as the defining characteristic 
of Swedish disequilibrium analysis. Negative 
feedback is the equilibrating mechanism in mi-
croeconomic disturbances. An increase in price 
results in an increase in quantity supplied and a 
fall in quantity demanded restoring the original 
intersection point of the two curves, other things 
being equal. Our requirement of either sign con-
sistently across the board might be regarded as a 
snapshot of the cumulative processes associated 
with the illustrious members of the Stockholm 
School. Also, adhering to the Katzner- Skott test 
the ‘new look’ production function cannot vi-
olate the properties of the familiar production 
function. For instance, the sign of the derivative 
must be positive. Our function does not appear 
to possess the technical flavor of an engineer-
ing relationship. However, using the first-order 
condition in the case of the firm, equation 4, our 
production function is f(c*/f′(x)). (we have now 
used all the requirements of the multi-market 
equilibrium). Assuming a concave production 
function, f′(x) ≥ 0. In the spirit but not the letter 
of Professor Frisch, the motivation is especially 
the possibility of emergence from a recession 
where the smooth working of market n depends 
on the frictionless working of n — 1 markets. 
Underlying the interdependence is the division 
of labour and the extent of the market. One piece 
of evidence is that in a model of the equilibrium 
wage equation for the Eurozone countries, wag-
es are seen to be positively related to produc-
tivity and negatively related to unemployment 
(Camarero et al., 2016). Flexible labour mar-
kets are associated with wage restraint. Return-
ing to the theme of Market versus Plan, gov-
ernment interventions tends to accentuate wage 
moderation as the Plan is a social optimization 
exercise concerned with wage competitiveness. 
In the present instance, there was a break in the 
long-run relationships in 2004 because of which 
increased labour market flexibility and interna-
tional competition led to greater sensitivity of 
the long-run real wage to productivity. 
We can our flesh out our definition further 
by a well-known compositional counter-intu-
ition associated with Keynes. Taking the de-
rivative of the profit function equation 3 with 
respect to the wage rate we get a negative ex-
pression, - x. Reverting to another famous dis-
tinction, equation 3 is “notional”. In contrast, 
we have “effective” demand. An increase in 
the wage rate is cost to an individual produc-
er but income to a worker. In the aggregate, 
an increase in wages and consequent demand 
spills over into increased profits. In the pres-
ent case, an increase in hours worked increases 
the income of the worker. Writing our produc-
er maximand equation 3 ex post, incorporating 
the solution of the consumer-worker problem 
equation 2, we have
π(x) = pf (c*/f ′ (x)) - pc*   (5)
With a concave production function used 
earlier, we get ∂π/∂x ≥ 0. Both consumer/
worker and producer are better off. Higher 
income does not higher welfare make except 
under the emphasis of Ragnar Frisch that the 
greater number of hours worked and the higher 
wages that flow consequently would be spent 
on an array of consumer goods. We have an 
early empirical forecast of what would later 
turn out to be a foundational assumption of 
Post Keynesian economics in the difference 
between the propensities to consume of cap-
italists and workers. Consumer basics might 
even have to be imported without in any way 
detracting from the accumulation of capital 
that was the hallmark of the postwar recon-
struction efforts. 
3. Taxation and work
The aspect of taxation on the table below is 
“horizontal equity” a principle largely regard-
ed as incontrovertible by taxation experts. 
Equals must be treated equally. However, in 
searches for empirical validation of this con-
jecture, wide variations have been found in tax 
rates and consumption patterns within income 
groups (Alm, 2017). The broad conclusion is 
that households within the same income brack-
et might have different preference schedules, 
affecting the incidence of taxation. To in-
troduce taxation we have a tax rate of t, the 
worker’s take-home real wage then becoming 
(1 — t) wx. To w in all the expressions and 
optimality conditions above we multiply (1 — 
t). Looking to equation 2, we find that ∂x*/∂t 
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≥ 0. The income tax is an incentive to work. 
The logic seems elementary. The tax reduces 
disposable income. Consumption and enjoy-
ment of leisure not being inferior goods fall. 
Due to the latter, hours worked increase. It is 
a straightforward matter to consider the mir-
ror situation of a tax subsidy paid out to firms 
as Professor Sandmo does. From equation 3, 
we get ∂π/∂t ≥ 0. At the cost of repetition we 
observe that the positive effects are consistent 
with each other. In contrast, Professor Frisch 
effectively separates out t in the after-tax wage 
in equation 2 and gets a negative expression 
for it. Our difference in signs might be due 
to the level effect in his case and the calcu-
lation of a derivate in ours. We concede that 
Professor Frisch distinguishes between a tax 
imposed on income and in fact recommends 
a progressive structure there and a tax that is 
effort-neutral. Professor Sandmo translates a 
nuanced discussion of the connection between 
the two by Professor Frisch. Our treatment is 
standard microeconomics and to that extent is 
one-dimensional. 
Our formulation, particularly the specifi-
cation of an underemployment equilibrium, 
would be assisted by a move to indirect utility 
functions. Accordingly,
DEFINITION 2. The indirect utility 
function v(p, w) = maximum value of u(c, l) 
subject to pc ≤ wx.
Likewise, without any confusion with the 
earlier ‘traditional’ profit function, we have
DEFINITION 3. The profit function
π(p, w) = maximum value of pf(x) - wx.
DEFINITION 4. We define a social 
equilibrium as a pair (p*, w*) such that 
v(p*, w*) ≥ v(p, w) 
π(p*, w*) ≥ π(p, w) 
In order to check that our movement from 
direct to indirect utility functions does not fall 
foul of the Katzner-Skott criterion, we rely on 
the properties of the functions given above. 
The indirect utility function is homogenous 
of degree zero in the arguments and the profit 
function is homogenous of degree one in the 
arguments. But first we need to provide Roy’s 
Identity in our case. It states
 (6)
By Euler’s theorem we have
 (7)
Substituting equation 6 into equation 7 we 
indeed get
In the case of the producer the theorem is
   (8)
Taking the derivatives called for in equa-
tion 5 and plugging them into equation 8 we 
confirm
wx* - pc* = 0 (9)
We have not had occasion to specify the 
maximal level of output given by the full em-
ployment of labour via the production function. 
Indeed, with the novel production function 
originating with Professor Frisch, the equali-
ty of what we might term the inter marginal 
product of labour with the wage is unlikely to 
hold. Since the consumer-worker and producer 
problems interlock, it is natural to consider the 
social equilibrium as applying to a level of out-
put less than the full employment level. 
4. Conclusion
Ragnar Frisch grappled with the problem of 
reconstructing an economy from the deterio-
ration of human and material resources. As an 
academic, he needed to define an equilibrium 
that was suboptimal and inefficient. Once hav-
ing done so, remarkably he did not attend to the 
problem as Keynes would have done through 
the medium of government expenditure. Both 
were concerned with the collapse of economic 
endeavour when the firing of that side of the 
government budget would have been the nat-
ural response. A partial explanation might be 
Joan Robinson’s unconfirmed quip attributed 
to Gerald Shove, also apocryphal, that Keynes 
“never spent the twenty minutes necessary to 
understand the theory of value”. Keynes was 
eloquent in his testimony for public works to 
employ desperately-willing hands. His power-
ful polemics found sympathetic ears in the po-
litical heads of the capitalist world of the day. 
In contrast, Professor Frisch dug into human 
incentives through the device of direct taxes 
impacting on work efforts. Only a master the-
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orist would have the confidence to originate 
a social interpretation of a technological con-
struct, the production function. Ragnar Frisch 
invented what we have called the inter mar-
ginal productivity of labour. We have no more 
than entered spaces opened by him respectful-
ly noting that our standard account cannot cap-
ture all the nuances of his historical-cum-an-
alytical exegesis of his country. In a structur-
al account, we need to trace the effects from 
workers and consumers to producers and back, 
from the workplace to the factory to the retail 
store and back again. Only then is the Pareto 
improvement of the existing social equilibrium 
proved and the basis of a virtuous cycle laid. 
